

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 7208
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 06497

EXDIS DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS

FROM ATHERTON

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MARR, EG, IS, SA
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH CROWN PRINCE FAHD AUGUST 10

1. FOLLOWING IS REPORT ON AMBASSADOR WEST'S AND MY MEETING WITH CROWN PRINCE FAHD EVENING AUGUST 10, A SUMMARY OF WHICH WAS SENT IN JIDDA 5846. MEETING LASTED APPROXIMATELY ONE AND ONE-QUARTER HOURS AND WAS ATTENDED ON SAUDI SIDE, IN ADDITION TO FAHD, BY FOREIGN MINISTER SAUD, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MANSOURI AND AN INTERPRETER. WEST AND I WERE ACCOMPANIED BY KORN AND BOVIS.

2. AFTER AN EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS, FAHD SAID THAT BEFORE THE CONVERSATION WENT FURTHER HE WOULD LIKE TO SAY A WORD ABOUT THE "AMAZING RUMOR" THAT THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT WAS TRYING TO LINE UP THE ARAB COUNTRIES AGAINST SADAT'S PEACE EFFORT. QUITE TO THE CONTRARY FAHD SAID. THE SAG HAS ALWAYS WORKED FOR THE SUCCESS OF SADAT'S INITIATIVE AND DOES NOT UNDERSTAND HOW THIS STORY COULD GET AROUND. SAUDI ARABIA HAS MADE CLEAR TO IRAQ AND SYRIA THAT THEY SHOULD
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EITHER SUPPORT SADAT OR REFRAIN FROM ATTACKING HIM. FAHD EXPRESSED THE SUSPICION THAT THE RUMOR HAD COME FROM THE ISRAELIS. I SAID WE APPRECIATED SAUDI ARABIA'S SUPPORT FOR SADAT AND HIS INITIATIVE; WE WERE NOT QUESTIONING THAT BUT MORE SPECIFICALLY INDICATIONS THAT SAUDI ARABIA HAD DISCOURAGED A FURTHER ROUND OF EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI TALKS IN SINAI DURING THE SECRETARY'S VISIT, IN THE PERIOD

AFTER THE LEEDS TALKS. FAHD AGAIN SPOKE OF "MISUNDER-
STANDING" BUT SAID WE SHOULD NOW ALL LOOK TO THE FUTURE.

3. FAHD SAID HE WAS "VERY PLEASED" WITH THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE IN CALLING THE CAMP DAVID CONFERENCE. THE SAG WILL "IN ITS OWN WAY DO EVERYTHING IT CAN TO HELP CREATE THE PROPER ATMOSPHERE TO ASSURE THE SUCCESS OF THE CAMP DAVID MEETING". FAHD CALLED THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE "GOOD AND WELL TIMED" AND SAID SAG HOPES IT WILL BRING POSITIVE RESULTS. HE FELT SADAT HAD DONE EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO INSURE THE SUCCESS OF HIS PEACE EFFORT. SADAT'S POSITION IS EXACTLY THE OPPOSITE OF BEGIN'S, WHICH FAHD DESCRIBED AS ONE OF TOTAL INFLEXIBILITY AND UNWILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE. WHILE BEGIN IS UNCOMPROMISING, FAHD SAID, THE PRESIDENT OF ISRAEL AND THE MEMBERS OF THE , LABOR OPPOSITION PARTY ARE QUITE FLEXIBLE. IT SEEMS THAT EVERYBODY IN ISRAEL IS READY TO BEND A BIT EXCEPT BEGIN. CONTINUING IN THIS VEIN, FAHD DESCRIBED PERES AND WEIZMAN AS REASONABLE AND HONORABLE MEN, TRUE PATRIOTS WHO ARE READY TO TAKE THE STEPS NECESSARY TO MAKE PEACE.

4. FAHD SAID THAT FAILURE OF THE PEACE TALKS WOULD BE SERIOUS. THE ARAB COUNTRIES WOULD BE IN A STATE OF DISARRAY AND LIABLE TO TAKE UNPREDICTABLE STEPS. FAHD HOPED THAT IN THE EVENT THE U.S. EFFORT TO BRING EGYPT AND ISRAEL TOGETHER FAILS, THE U.S. WOULD COME OUT WITH
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ITS OWN "COMPLETE PRINCIPLES" AND THAT THEY WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION 242 AND BE JUST AND EQUITABLE. FAHD REITERATED THAT SAUDI ARABIA WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO SUPPORT PRESIDENT CARTER'S INITIATIVE AND TO PERSUADE OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES TO SUPPORT IT OR AT LEAST GIVE IT A CHANCE FOR SUCCESS. BUT THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN ANY PEACE PACKAGE, FAHD SAID, WILL BE A JUST AND EQUITABLE SOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. WITHOUT THIS, THERE CAN BE NO LASTING PEACE.

5. I EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR FAHD'S POSITIVE WORDS OF SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE. RECALLING MY TALK WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SAUD THE PREVIOUS EVENING, I STRESSED THAT THE USG IS HOLDING FIRM TO THE PEACE PRINCIPLES THAT IT HAS ENUNCIATED. THERE HAS BEEN A MISUNDERSTANDING FOLLOWING MY PREVIOUS STOP IN TAIF THAT THE U.S. POSITION HAD CHANGED, BUT I BELIEVE MY TALK WITH PRINCE SAUD HAD CLEARED THAT UP. I CONTINUED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD TAKEN THE DECISION TO INVITE SADAT AND BEGIN TO CAMP DAVID BECAUSE HE HAD CONCLUDED THAT THE MOMENT IS CRITICAL AND THERE IS NOT MUCH TIME LEFT TO START MOVEMENT TOWARD A PEACE SETTLEMENT. WE REALIZED THAT AN ALL-OUT

EFFORT WAS REQUIRED TO BREAK THE IMPASSE AND THAT THE U.S. WAS THE ONLY ONE THAT COULD DO SO, BUT I STRESSED THAT IT MUST BE DONE IN THE FRAMEWORK OF TALKS BETWEEN THE PARTIES. WE WOULD PUT FORWARD OUR IDEAS AND SUGGESTIONS, BUT THEY MUST EMERGE FROM THOSE TALKS.

6. I SAID THE SECRETARY HAD ASKED ME TO REAFFIRM TO THE SAG THAT OUR CONTRIBUTION TO THE SUCCESS OF THE CAMP DAVID TALKS WILL BE BASED ON ALL THE PRINCIPLES OF

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RESOLUTION 242 AS WE HAVE ALWAYS INTERPRETED THEM. I NOTED IN THIS REGARD THAT WE HAVE ALWAYS CONSIDERED THAT RESOLUTION 242 APPLIES ON ALL FRONTS. FAHD SAID THAT U.S. ADHERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF RESOLUTION 242 WILL GIVE SUPPORT TO JEWISH OPINION, BOTH IN ISRAEL AND THE U.S., THAT OPPOSES BEGIN AND WILL THEREBY CAUSE BEGIN TO BECOME MORE FLEXIBLE. FAHD THEN AGAIN SAID HE WANTED TO EMPHASIZE THAT ANY COMMUNIQUE THAT COMES OUT OF CAMP DAVID SHOULD INCLUDE A SECTION PROVIDING FOR THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS, PARTICULARLY FOR THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION; THIS IS VERY IMPORTANT. FAHD ADDED HE ALSO WANTED TO STRESS THAT PRESIDENT SADAT HAS GIVEN ALL THAT HE CAN, HE HAS REACHED HIS ROCK-BOTTOM POSITION, AND CAN GO NO FURTHER WITHOUT ENDANGERING THE PEACE EFFORT AND MODERATE ARAB SUPPORT FOR SADAT. (THIS WAS THE ONLY MENTION THAT FAHD MADE OF THE CONCERN SO FREQUENTLY EXPRESSED BY SAUD IN OUR CONVERSATION THE PREVIOUS EVENING, AND I SUSPECT THAT FAHD BROUGHT IT UP ONLY AFTER HAVING BEEN REMINDED BY SAUD WHO, A FEW MINUTES EARLIER, CAME OVER

AND WHISPERED SOMETHING IN FAHD'S EAR.)

7. FAHD THEN LAUNCHED INTO A LONG DISCOURSE ON THE NEED
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FOR THE U.S. TO MAKE AN EFFORT TO WIN OVER THE PALESTINIANS. THE U.S. SHOULD EXPRESS ITS SUPPORT FOR SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS. THE MAJORITY OF THE PALESTINIANS IS MODERATE, FAHD SAID, BUT WITHOUT U.S. INFLUENCE, THE RADICAL MINORITY WILL PREVAIL. WE ARABS ARE EMOTIONAL PEOPLE, FAHD SAID, WHO CAN BE WON OVER BY "A FEW SWEET WORDS". IT WOULD COST THE U.S. VERY LITTLE TO TELL THE PALESTINIANS THAT IT UNDERSTANDS THEIR POSITION AND THEIR RIGHTS. SHOWING THEM THAT YOU SYMPATHIZE WITH THEM, FAHD SAID, WOULD DRAW THE PALESTINIANS TO YOU AND ALSO HELP SAUDI ARABIA IN INFLUENCING THEM.

8. I SAID OUR OBJECTIVE AT CAMP DAVID WILL BE TO GET AGREEMENT ON A FRAMEWORK OF BROAD PRINCIPLES THAT WILL BE SEEN AS REASONABLE AND FAIR BY ALL MODERATE AND REASONABLE ARABS. THESE PRINCIPLES WILL BE CONSISTENT WITH EVERYTHING SECRETARY VANCE AND THE PRESIDENT HAVE PREVIOUSLY INDICATED TO THE SAG REGARDING OUR VIEWS. WE BELIEVE THAT ALL OF THE KEY ISSUES MUST BE DEALT WITH -- WITHDRAWAL, SECURITY, PEACE AND THE PALESTINIANS. OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO FIND A BASIS ACCEPTABLE TO OTHER ARAB PARTIES FOR ENTERING THE PEACE PROCESS. FAHD INTERJECTED THAT THIS IS A WISE POLICY. I SAID THAT ON THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE, PRESIDENT CARTER FEELS THAT THE LANGUAGE THAT HE USED AT ASWAN IS A PRACTICAL WAY OF EXPRESSING THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS AND I NOTED THAT THE ASWAN FORMULA USES THE PHRASE "LEGITIMATE RIGHTS". AFTER A BRIEF EXCHANGE IN ARABIC WITH SAUD, FAHD SAID PERHAPS WE COULD ADD JUST ONE OR TWO WORDS TO THE ASWAN FORMULA; I.E., THAT THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE HAVE THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION. THAT WOULD HELP IMMENSELY, FAHD SAID. I EXPLAINED THAT WE BELIEVE
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THE ASWAN FORMULA DOES INDEED EXPRESS THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION.

9. I SAID THAT BEFORE CLOSING I WOULD LIKE TO ADD THAT WHILE WE HOPE THERE WILL BE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES AT THE END OF THE CAMP DAVID MEETING, IF THERE IS NOT, I

BELIEVED THAT AT THE LEAST THE U.S. POSITION WOULD BE CLEAR. I ALSO STRESSED THAT IN INVITING THE PARTIES TO CAMP DAVID, PRESIDENT CARTER HAS TAKEN A VERY COURAGEOUS STEP. I WAS SURE THAT THE SAG WOULD AGREE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE AND SADAT'S ACCEPTANCE, DESERVE THE BROADEST PUBLIC SUPPORT. BOTH PRINCE SAUD AND THE CROWN PRINCE HAD NOW TOLD ME OF THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE AND I HOPED THAT THE SAG WOULD TAKE STEPS TO LET THE ENTIRE WORLD KNOW ABOUT THIS SAUDI POSITION. FAHD REPLIED THAT HE HAD BEEN GIVING THOUGHT TO THIS AND HE AGREED THAT A STATEMENT MUST BE ISSUED. AFTER THE MEETING SAUD TOLD ME THAT THE CROWN PRINCE HAD DECIDED THAT A STATEMENT WOULD BE ISSUED ON AUGUST 11.

10. EARLIER IN THIS CONVERSATION, FAHD TOOK THE INITIATIVE TO RAISE THE REPORT THAT I HAD MENTIONED TO SAUD THE PREVIOUS EVENING THAT THE SOVIETS ARE SAYING THAT THE SAUDIS WANT THEM TO JOIN THE PEACE TALKS. FAHD VIGOROUSLY DENIED THAT THIS WAS SO. IF THE SOVIET UNION GOES TO HEAVEN, FAHD SAID, WE DON'T WANT TO GO THERE. FAHD SAID THE SOVIETS ARE STIRRING UP A VIGOROUS PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN BOTH AGAINST THE SAG AND AGAINST HIM PERSONALLY AND WERE TRYING TO PERSUADE OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES THAT HE WAS SECRETLY IN CONTACT WITH ISRAEL'S LEADERS, IN ORDER TO DISCREDIT HIM. FAHD SAID THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES MUST BE PUTTING OUT THE RUMOR ABOUT SAUDI ARABIA'S WANTING THEM TO JOIN THE PEACE TALKS. HE SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHO

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THE SAUDI DIPLOMAT WAS WHO ALLEGEDLY TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT

SAUDI ARABIA WANTED THEM IN THE NEGOTIATIONS; PERHAPS,
FAHD SAID, HIS NAME WAS QADAFI. HE COMMENTED WRYLY
THAT PERHAPS IT WOULD DO THE SAG SOME GOOD WITH THE
SYRIANS AND THE IRAQIS.

11. BEFORE CLOSING I HAD A BRIEF DISCUSSION WITH FAHD
ON LEBANON WHICH HAS BEEN REPORTED IN JIDDA 5847.
SUDDARTH

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